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where the necessity for action was sufficiently compelling to in-
duce the court to issue the order.5 0 In any event, the party en-
joined should find adequate protection in the bond5' required of
the plaintiff and in his right to seek dissolution of the injunc-
tion.12
ALVIN B. RUBIN
A CIVIL LAW APPROACH TO THE REPARATION OF
EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCES BY ABUSIVE
LANGUAGE
The interest in peace of mind, in the protection of personal
dignity and in freedom from mental disquietude has been ac-
corded only scant legal protection in the United States. Invasions
of this interest have not been recognized as a distinct and inde-
pendent tort. In those cases where it has been felt that recovery
should be allowed, compensation has been granted only in the
form of parasitic damages for the commission of a recognized tort.
Damages have been "tacked on" in actions for assault and battery,'
false imprisonment, 2 libel, and slander." Reluctance to give forth-
50. Such a situation might be presented where a mandatory injunction is
sought to compel the defendant to restore a situation which he has changed
in violation of a prohibitory order. See Levy v. New Orleans Waterworks
Co., 38 La. Ann. 25 (1886), for an example of such a situation. In this case
the mandatory injunction to compel restoration of the status quo prior to
violation of the prohibitory injunction was issued ex parte. Anglo-American
equity courts recognize such a case as a proper one for the issuance of an
interlocutory mandatory order. Keys v. Alligood, 178 N.C. 16, 100 S.E. 113
(1919). See Texas Pipe Line Co. v. Burton Drilling Co., 54 S.W. (2d) 190
(Tex. Civ. App. 1932), noted in (1934) 12 Tex. L. Rev. 235, for a discussion of
the American equity cases on the subject.
51. See La. Act 29 of 1924, § 2 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 2079]; Art. 304, La.
Code of Practice of 1870. But a defendant may, by injunction, be compelled
to restore property wrongfully taken. Petit v. Cormier, 1 McGloin 370 (La.
App. 1881).
52. See La. Act 29 of 1924, § 2 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 2079); Art. 307, La.
Code of Practice of 1870.
1. Warner v. Talbot, 112 La. 817, 36 So. 743 (1903); Christmas v. Lofaso,
13 Orl. App. 443 (La. App. 1916); Fontenelle v. Waguespack, 150 La. 316, 90
So, 662 (1922); Derouen v. Fontenot, 8 La. App. 652 (1928); Davis v. Rondall,
17 La. App. 291, 135 So. 727 (1931); Davis v. Lindsay Furniture Co., 19 La.
App. 169, 138 So. 439 (1931); Noguin v. Belliot, 155 So. 261 (La. App. 1934);
Lorenz v. Hunt, 89 Cal. App. 6, 264 Pac. 336 (1928); Ransom v. McDermott,
215 Iowa 594, 246 N.W. 266 (1933); Kline v. Kline, 158 Ind. 602, 64 N.E. 9 (1902);
Trogden v. Terry, 72 N.C. 540, 90 S.E. 583 (1916).
2. Block v. McGuire, 18 La. Ann. 417 (1866); Healy v. Playland Amuse-
ments, Inc., 199 So. 682 (La. App. 1940); Gadsden General Hospital v. Ham-
ilton, 212 Ala. 531, 103 So. 553 (1925); Fisher v. Rumler, 239 Mich. 224, 214 N.W.
310 (1927); Jones v. Hebdo, 88 W.Va. 386, 106 S.E. 898 (1921). Compare Talcott
v. National Exhibition Co., 144 App. Div. 337, 128 N.Y. Supp. 1059 (1911).
3. Dufort v. Abadie, 23 La. Ann. 280 (1871); Tuyes v. Chambers, 144 La.
COMMENTS
right recognition to this interest in peace of mind is not due to an
unsympathetic attitude toward the plaintiff. It is founded upon
apparent administrative difficulties, such as the difficulty of proof
and the accurate measurement of damages. 4 In the English case
of Lynch v. Knight the court said: "Mental pain or anxiety the
law cannot value, and does not pretend to redress, when the un-
lawful act causes that alone." The possibility of a docket crowded
with trivial and trumped-up claims, along with the concomitant
loss of judicial dignity, should not be overlooked."
French law forthrightly recognizes mental injury (le prdju-
dice moral).7 French writers consider mental injury just as real
as material injury and equally deserving of legal recognition in
an action for damages. It is under authority of Article 1382 of the
French Civil Code," the counterpart of Article 2315 of the Louisi-
ana Civil Code, that such a position finds its justification. Such
injury, although admittedly composed of elements more difficult to
estimate in pecuniary terms than tangible material damage, is yet
a basis for a money judgment.9 Moreover, injuries to feelings and
to honor'0 are protected even though not accompanied by more
723, 81 So. 265 (1919); Gernon v. Maulhes, 150 La. 927. 91 So. 300 (1922); Ford
v. Jeane, 159 La. 1041, 106 So. 558 (1925); Lasseigne v. Tolmas, 164 La. 529, 114
So. 122 (1927); Johnson v. Crow, 158 So. 857 (La. App. 1935); Sclar v. Resnick,
192 Iowa 669, 185 N.W. 273 (1921); Pion v. Caron, 237 Mass. 107, 129 N.E. 369
(1921); Hibdon v. Moyer, 197 S.W. 1117 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
4. But see Graham v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 109 La. 1069, 1074, 34
So. 91, 93 (1903), where the court points out that awarding damages for the
physical pain that results from a bodily wound is no more speculative than
awarding damages for pain and suffering caused by mental and emotional
disturbance,
5. 9 H. L. Cas. 577, 598, 11 Eng. Reprint 854 (1861).
6. It must be remembered also that truth is a good defense to an action
for slander. But the very essence of truth may be as emotionally distressing
as falsehood. Often truth "hurts" more for the very reason that it is true.
7. Under Article 1382 of the French Civil Code in Dalloz and Verg6, cited
in Graham v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 109 La. 1069, 34 So. 91 (1903),
authorities are found to the following effect:
"No. 46. Un dommage matdriel n'est pas le seule qui donne ouverture 4
l'action en reparation 41 sufflt d'un intdr~t moral."
(Translation) "A material damage is not the only one which gives rise
to the action in reparation; mental interest is sufficient."
"No. 290. Que le prdjudice causd sort matdriel ou moral la responsabilit6
est encourrue."
(Translation) "Whether the damage caused be material or mental, re-
sponsibility is incurred."
For an elaborate treatment of le prejudice moral see Bosc, Essal sur les
Elements Constitutifs du D6lit Civil (1901) 206-239.
8. "Toute fait quelsonque de l'homme, qui cause d autri un dommage,
oblige celui par Ie faute duquel il est arrivd a le rdparer."
(Translation) "Every act whatever of man obliges him by whose fault
it happened to repair It."
9. 6 Planiol et Ripert, Trait6 Pratique de Droit Civil Frangais (1930) 751,
no 546; Bose, op. cit. supra note 7, at 209.
10. Id. at 754, nD 548.
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tangible elements of damage. For example, the emotional disturb-
ance occasioned by receipt of a letter seen by no one save the
recipient is compensable. 11 The French commentator Capitant
says that "the jurisprudence has always accorded damages for
mental injury resulting... from injurious or defamatory words. '1 2
It thus appears that the infliction of mental and emotional dis-
turbance is an actionable wrong in itself and there need not neces-
sarily be present any prdjudice materiel in order to sustain re-
covery.
The French view should even more readily find acceptance in
Louisiana where the Civil Code expressly recognizes that "there
are cases in which damages may be assessed without calculating
altogether on the pecuniary loss, or the privation of pecuniary
gain to the party."'" Cases are to be found in Louisiana where re-
covery was allowed for mental suffering; but in these cases recog-
nized grounds of tort liability, other than the independent and
distinct tort of injury to the sensibilities, were present. On one
occasion the Louisiana Supreme Court declared that the infliction
of mental suffering was an independent tort. In so doing it em-
phasized the civilian source of Louisiana tort law as expressed in
Article 2315. The language of the court is interesting:
"The weight of common law authority seems to be against
a recovery for mental suffering or injury to feelings (when un-
accompanied by any physical injury), such as shock, fright,
etc., or for worry over damages to any personal or property
right; but our law of torts is found principally in the Civil
Code, particularly Article 2315, taken from the civil law, and
which does recognize a right of action for such injuries .... .14
The case of Tuyes v. Chambers, in which this statement oc-
curs, however, was one involving defamatory utterances made as
a part of collection tactics and fell under well accepted concepts
of libel and slander obtaining in this jurisdiction. It is doubtful
11. Bose, op. cit. supra note 7, at 214; Trib. de paix de Lille, 25 octobre
1897, Gas. Pal., 1898.1.579.
12. Les Grands arr~ts de la Jurisprudence Civil (1934) 217: "La jurispru-
dence a toujours accordd des dommages--4nt~rdts pour le prdjudice d'ordre
moral rdsultant . . . de propos . .. njurieux on diffamatores .... 
13. The article continues: "Where the contract has for its object the
gratification of some intellectual enjoyment, whether in religion, morality or
taste, or some convenience or other legal gratification, although these are
not appreciated in money by the parties, yet damages are due for their
breach .. " Art. 1934(3), La. Civil Code of 1870.
Although this article is found in the section of the code dealing with
conventional obligations, its relevancy might reasonably be argued.
14. 144 La. 723, 731, 81 So. 265, 267 (1919).
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that the Louisiana court was any more liberal in this instance
than the courts of other states have been in similar situations.15
In supporting the above quoted statement in Tuyes v. Cham-
bers, the court referred to Graham v. Western Union Telegraph
Company,16 where the action was for damages for mental distress
growing out of a delay in the transmission of a death message.
In this case the court emphasized that the common law limitations
on the right to recovery for emotional disturbance do not obtain
in Louisiana. Here again, however, the action was one recognized
in many common law jurisdictions and involved a breach of duty
by a common carrier. The creation of an independent tort for
emotional disturbance was unnecessary.
Only one case has been found in which the Louisiana Supreme
Court definitely appears to have held that an intentionally in-
flicted emotional disturbance constitutes an independent tort. This
is the well known "pot of gold" case.17 The facts of this case in-
volved a meticulously executed practical joke of some magnitude.
The defendants, who were aware that the plaintiff, an old maid
nearly forty-five years old, had been for three months searching
for buried treasure, hid a pot of "gold" (rocks) under such cir-
cumstances that the plaintiff would discover it and its contents
under extremely disappointing and humiliating circumstances.
The court caused the joke to boomerang on the perpetrators to
the tune of five hundred dollars.
Not insignificant among the sundry causes of mental disquie-
tude is insulting and abusive language. Considerations of the ex-
isting legal means of dealing with this problem-what the courts
have said in this connection and what they have actually done-
comprise a body of material from which may be drawn evidence
of the extent of the protection afforded the interest in mental
tranquility.
The law of defamation was developed for the protection of
the reputation. The law seeks to protect the right not to be cast
down in the estimation of one's fellows. The social and economic
importance of reputation must not be minimized. In business and
in the professions it is of paramount importance that reputation
be unimpaired.
There is a close connection between interest in reputation and
the interest in peace of mind and personal dignity. Often these
15. See cases collected in Note (1932) 66 U. S. L. Rev. 349.
16. 109 La. 1069, 34 So. 91 (1902).
17. Nickerson v. Hodges, 146 La. 735, 84 So. 37 (1920).
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interests are concomitant, and it is difficult to separate them.
Courts have recognized this, and where injury to reputation is
found, the damages will include compensation for mental suffer-
ing.18 In the case of Fitzpatrick v. Daily States Publishing Com-
pany, 9 the plaintiff, the mayor of New Orleans, sued for damages
for an alleged libel contained in an article in defendant's news-
paper. In affirming a verdict for five hundred dollars the supreme
court said: "But every publisher is therefore liable not only for
the estimated damages to credit and reputation and such special
damages as may appear, but also ... damages on account of in-
jured feelings ... "
What relief does the law of defamation offer where there is
no injury to reputation, and no special damage can be shown, but
where abusive, opprobrious and insulting oral language causes
injury to feelings and mental disturbance?
The common law rule regarding slander is that defamatory
words are not actionable unless they fall within certain categories
of words actionable per se,20 or unless the plaintiff alleges and
proves "special damages," that is, that as a result of the spoken
words he has suffered a pecuniary loss.2' On the other hand, the
test for libel is very liberal and broad. Any written words tend-
ing to expose a person to ridicule, disgrace, contempt, or hatred
are libelous and actionable per se, that is, without proof of special
damage. It is enough that the plaintiff has been made ridiculous.
It need not be shown that people believe unpleasant things to be
true of him. It will be seen, therefore, that only the law of writ-
ten defamation is available to protect the sense of dignity stand-
ing alone.
Unfortunately for the law's development, most insult is ex-
temporaneous and verbal. Insulting language is more frequently
the product of a sudden flash of pique than the result of ill feeling
18. Dufort v. Abadie, 23 La. Ann. 280 (1871); Williams v. McManus, 38
La. Ann. 161 (1886); Fitzpatrick v. Daily States Publishing Co., Ltd., 48 La.
Ann. 1116, 20 So. 173 (1896); Poissent v. Reuther, 51 La. Ann. 965, 25 So. 935
(1899).
19. 48 La. Ann. 1116, 20 So. 173 (1896).
20. (1) Words charging some crime of moral turpitude for which one may
be indicted and punished; (2) words accusing one of having certain loath-
some communicable diseases; (3) words which tend to harm a person in his
trade, business, profession or office; (4) words imputing unchastity to a
woman. Harper, A Treatise on the Law of Torts (1933) 285 et seq., § 239.
21. "Thus, to allege and prove 'special' damages sufficient to make spoken
defamatory words actionable, the damage must be of a character such that
the law will recognize it as pecuniary. Accordingly, mere emotional disturb-
ance Is insufficient when not accompanied by actual pecuniary loss legally




deliberately reduced to writing. This being the case, most insults
are not actionable as slander (1) because they do not include
words in the limited group which are actionable per se, and (2)
because it is extremely difficult to prove special damage. If the
test for libel were applicable to oral defamation, slander would be
expected to be brought into frequent use as a means of enforcing
compensation for insulting language.
In Louisiana two novel concepts afford a different approach
to the problem: (1) Our tort law purports to stem from Article
2315 of the Civil Code which reads, "Every act whatever of man
that causes damage to another, obliges him by whose fault it hap-
pened to repair it. . . ."; (2) Louisiana, under the leading case of
Miller v. Holstein,2 2 does not observe the traditional common law
distinction between libel and slander. 23 In the rehearing in the
Miller case,24 Mr. Justice Garland becomes quite vehement in his
denunciation of the common law distinction. "The rule of the
common law is in some respects absurd, in others positively un-
just, and was established for the double purpose of repressing
frivolous actions, and saving the judges the trouble of trying
cases.,
25
It would seem to follow then, that in Louisiana, any spoken
words, which would be libelous at common law if written, are
actionable; that mental suffering, a disturbed peace of mind, a
wounded pride and a damaged dignity, standing alone, are poten-
tially capable of supporting an action for damages.
To what extent has recovery for mental anguish caused by
offensive and insulting language actually been allowed under the
Louisiana law of slander? What the Louisiana courts have ac-
tually done in such cases is more significant than what they have
said, which through the years forms no coherent pattern.
There are examples of cases where, on first blush, it might
appear that the Louisiana courts have been more willing to award
damages for mental disquietude than have been the courts in
other jurisdictions. A typical case is the insulting of a passenger
22. 16 La. 389 (1840).
23. Feray v. Foote, 12 La. Ann. 894 (1857); Spotorno v. Fourichon, 40 La.
Ann. 423, 4 So. 71 (1888); Savoie v. Scanlan, 43 La. Ann. 967, 9 So. 916 (1891);
Warner v. Clark, 45 La. Ann. 863, 869, 13 So. 203, 206 (1893); Tarleton v. La-
garde, 46 La. Ann. 1386, 1373, 16 So. 180, 181 (1894). But see Dunn v. Burat,
155 La. 376, 99 So. 296 (1924) (where the Louisiana Supreme Court quoted a
classification of words actionable per se set forth by the United States Su-
preme Court); Santana v. Item Co., 192 La. 819, 189 So. 442 (1939).
24. Miller v. Holstein, 16 La. 389 (1840).
25. Id. at 407.
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on a public carrier by the latter's servant. 2 In May v. Shreveport
Traction Company7 the defendant's servant implied that the
plaintiff was a negro by pointing to the colored section on the car
and saying: '"Don't you belong over there?" The court awarded
damages for the plaintiff's mental disturbance and humiliation.
Another kind of case is represented by Moody v. Kenney2 where
the house detective in a large hotel went to the plaintiff's room
and asked the plaintiff's husband what he was doing with a
woman in his room. Recovery was allowed here for the plaintiff's
outraged sense of dignity and the mental suffering which she en-
dured. But an examination of the jurisprudence of other juris-
dictions reveals that carriers29 and innkeepers, 0 because of their
peculiar relation toward the public, are under a special obligation
not to wound the feelings of any patron. Recovery is allowed for
mental anguish, apart from any physical injury, just as is done
in Louisiana.
In Louisiana, apart from such cases, no recovery has gen-
erally been allowed solely for humiliation and mental disturbance
caused by mere harsh and unpleasant language causing no con-
comitant injury to the reputation of the plaintiff except in cases
where the words actually used would have been actionable per se
26. In Lafltte v. New Orleans City & Lake R.R., 43 La. Ann. 34, 8 So. 701
(1891), the defendant's servant charged the plaintiff with having handed him
a counterfeit dollar and threatened to have him arrested. Plaintiff recovered
$400 damages. In Haile v. New Orleans Ry. and Light Co., 135 La. 229, 65 So.
225 (1914), where after the plaintiff fell down in the defendant's car through
no fault of the defendant, the conductor said to the plaintiff: "a big fat
woman like you had no business sitting in front of the car." Plaintiff was
awarded $250 for humiliation and mortification. In Molczewski v. New Or-
leans Ry. & Light Co., 156 La. 830, 101 So. 213 (1924), the defendant, a public
carrier, leased an amusement park and ran its cars to and from the park.
Plaintiff, a woman, was excluded from defendant's auto parking lot by de-
fendant's servant who spoke to her in an insulting tone saying: "Hey, hey,
you stop; you can't come in here .... If you do I will have an affidavit made
against you." The court awarded her $500 damages.
27. 127 La. 420, 53 So. 671 (1910).
28. 153 La. 1007, 97 So. 21 (1923).
29. Bleecker v. Colorado & S. Ry., 50 Colo. 140, 114 Pac. 481 (1911); Hum-
phrey v. Michigan United Rys., 166 Mich. 645, 132 N.W. 447 (1911); Lamson v.
Great Northern Ry., 114 Minn. 132, 130 N.W. 945 (1911); Knoxville Traction
Co. v. Lane, 103 Tenn. 376, 53 S.W. 557 (1899). The law has been extended to
Include theaters [Planchard v. Klaw & Erlanger New Orleans Theatres Co.,
166 La. 235, 117 So. 132 (1928); Weber-Stair Co. v. Fisher, 119 S.W. 19 (Ky.
App. 1909); Laenger Theatres Corp. v. Herndon, 180 Miss. 791, 178 So. 86
(1938)] amusement parks [Davis v. Tacoma Ry. & Power Co., 35 Wash. 203, 77
Pac. 209 (1904)], and even a circus [Boswell v. Barnum & Bailey, 135 Tenn.
35, 185 S.W. 692 (1916)].
30. Emmke v. De Silva, 293 Fed. 17 (C.C.A. 8th, 1923); Dixon v. Hotel
Tutwiler Operating Co., 214 Ala. 396, 108 So. 26 (1926); De Wolf v. Ford, 193
N.Y. 397, 86 N.E. 527 (1908).
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at common law. For example, merely applying vile curse words
to a person has been held not to constitute actionable slander."
Louisiana nominally rejects the common law classification of
words actionable per se. Yet in the cases where recovery has been
allowed for slander alone, aside from any special damage, the
words would have been actionable of themselves at common law.
Words which "charge some crime of moral turpitude [such as lar-
ceny] for which one may be indicted or punished" furnish by
their very use a cause of action at common law.8 2 With consonant
reasoning calling a person a "thief" has been expressly held ac-
tionable per se in Louisiana.8 3 In other cases damages have been
awarded to one called a "thief" without mention of the epithet
being actionable per se and at the same time without any finding
of special damage to the plaintiff.' 4 Similar results have been at-
tained where the words imputed unchastity to a woman 5 or were
such as tended to harm the plaintiff in his profession."
The requirement that the slanderous words reach the ear of
31. Dunn v. Burat, 155 La. 376, 99 So. 296 (1924), where the defendant
called the plaintiff a G- d- s- o- b-. The court dismissed the words as
"merely disgusting and senseless abuse." In McKoin v. McKoin, 168 La. 32, 121
So. 182 (1929), a divorce suit in which plaintiff claimed that he was publicly
defamed by defendant when she called him a s- o- b--. The court followed
the Dunn case.
32. See note 8, supra.
33. Mallerich v. Mertz, 19 La. Ann. 194 (1867); Fitzpatrick v. Zedaird
Realty Co., Inc., 121 So. 680 (La. App. 1929); Edwards v. Derrick, 193 La. 331,
190 So. 671 (1939).
34. Poissenot v. Reuther, 51 La. Ann. 965, 25 So. 935 (1899); Simpson v.
Robinson, 104 La. 180, 28 So. 908 (1900); Fatjo v. Seidel, 109 La. 699, 33 So.
737 (1903); Lasseigne v. Tolmas, 164 La. 529, 114 So. 122 (1927). However, in
Mihojevich v. Bodechtel, 48 La. Ann. 618, 19 So. 672 (1896), where the defend-
ant, an old maid of over eighty years, called the plaintiff, her male tenant,
a "dirty rat," a "thief," and "swindler." The jury's verdict for the defendant
was affirmed, the court saying in the syllabus that "slanderous epithets are
not always actionable." The court dismissed the words as "the irate and im-
pulsive utterances of an old woman, whose only means of defense against a
fancied or real wrong ... was an unruly and mischievous tongue."
35. Jackson v. Briede, 156 La. 573, 100 So. 722 (1924), where the defendant,
the superintendent of a mortuary establishment, accused the plaintiff, a
stenographer, in the presence of another stenographer and the general man-
ager, of living with the general manager and referred to her as "that damned
woman." In Gernon v. Mailhes, 150 La. 927, 91 So. 300 (1922), defendant called
the plaintiff a "big fat pig" and accused her of intimacy with their father.
Other cases Include William v. McManus, 38 La. Ann. 161 (1886); Von Eye v.
Byrnes, 124 La. 769, 50 So. 708 (1909); Bache v. Stoltz, 134 So. 112 (La. App.
1931).
36. Ford v. Jeane, 159 La. 1041, 106 So. 558 (1929), where the defendant,
before a session of the school board, accused the plaintiff, a young t'eacher,
of being drunk at a public dinner; Searcy v. Interurban Transp. Co., Inc., 189
La. 183, 179 So. 75 (1938), where the plaintiff, a minister of the gospel suffered
a stroke of apoplexy. Defendant's agent negligently thought he was drunk
and accused him of being in that condition.
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a third person, 7 together with the mutual abuse doctrine,8 would
preclude a recovery in many cases where the plaintiff experienced
appreciable mental suffering because of a shocked dignity and ex-
treme humiliation.
But there are cases allowing recovery in which the slander-
ous words were heard by only a few people who could not have
believed the truth of the assertions. Aside from the carrier and
innkeeper cases, they represent the courts' nearest approach to
awarding damages solely on the basis of wounded feelings and
humiliation. A typical case is Von Eye v. Byrnes5 in which, in
the presence of only a few neighbors, defendant called plaintiff,
a widow over seventy years old, a "whore" and another vile name.
The judgment for defendant was reversed and plaintiff was
awarded two hundred and fifty dollars damages. Here there is
little question of compensation for reputational injury. It is ex-
tremely unlikely that the neighbors believed the charge or that
the plaintiff was lowered in their estimation. In Fitzpatrick v.
Zedaird Realty Company, Incorporated4 0 a female real estate
agent of defendant called the plaintiff, an old man, "a dirty old
man, a liar and a thief." The only third person hearing the words
was the plaintiff's thirteen-year-old grandson.41
It is obvious in such cases that the court is not awarding dam-
ages because plaintiff's reputation has been impaired. Recovery
37. Gilliand v. Feibleman's Incorporated, 161 La. 24, 108 So. 112 (1928).
38. See Von Eye v. Byrnes, 124 La. 769, 773, 50 So. 708, 709 (1909).
39. 124 La. 769, 50 So. 708 (1909).
40. 121 So. 680 (La. App. 1929).
41. Other cases in which the plaintiff's reputation was not injured or only
slightly impaired, and In which the court appeared to be awarding damages
solely as a balm for the plaintiff's injured feelings follows: Fatjo v. Seidel,
109 La. 699, 33 So. 737 (1903) where the defendant charged the plaintiff In the
presence of her sixteen year old son and her sister with being a "thief," a
"God-damned thief" and with having "robbed me of $5000." The court says:
"To charge a mother, in the presence of her 16 year old son with being a
thief, has about it something shocking and revolting that does not accompany
the same act in the presence of mete strangers." (109 La. at 703, 33 So. at
738.) In Searcy v. Interurban Transp. Co., Inc., 184 La. 183, 179 So. 75 (1938).
the defendant accused a minister of the gospel with being drunk while in fact
he was suffering a stroke of apoplexy. In Edwards v. Derrick, 193 La. 331, 190
So. 571 (1939), it was shown that the plaintiff, a candidate for sheriff, lost but
one vote by reason of the slander. He recovered $500 for damaged feelings.
In Gernon v. Matlkes, 150 La. 927, 91 So. 300 (1922), the defendant called the
plaintiff a "big fat pig" and accused her of undue intimacy with the defend-
ant's father. Only two outsiders heard the charge. The court found that
"there is not the slightest evidence that the witnesses were In the least in-
terested in the father or gave the matter any further thought." The court
found an award of $300 sufficient, for "the damage suffered by the plaintiff
was, under the circumstances, negligible and a nominal award as a solace
for her wounded feelings will suffice." In Bache v. Stoltz, 134 So. 112 (La. App.
1931), the defendant, in the presence of the plaintiff's mother and a friend,
called the plaintiff a "crooked thing" and imputed loose morals to her.
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is in fact allowed because the court feels that anyone who is ex-
posed to language which shocks his sensibilities and interferes
with his peace of mind and sense of dignity to such a degree that
it produces genuine mental anguish should recover damages not-
withstanding he has not suffered "actual" or special damages.
Admittedly the language used in some cases would be actionable
per se at common law. Yet if Louisiana does not recognize a sep-
arate class of words actionable per se, at least the door is left open
for the recognition of a general cause of action for wounded feel-
ings, humiliation and injured dignity. Judicial utterances in sup-
port of such a position may be found in cases where the court was
probably convinced that the defamatory words had produced a
degree of emotional disturbance worthy of being soothed by a
money judgment.
What are the chances of recovery for injured feelings where
the plaintiff has engaged in a mutual exchange of defamatory
statements?42 Since the early case of Fulda v. Caldwell,4 it has
been frequently held that the defendant owes no damages where
there has been an interchange of opprobrious epithets, mutual
vituperation, and abuse."
Mutual abuse seems to be a defense for written defamation as
well.4 5 In the recent case of Kenner v. Milner" two members of the
bar each published defamatory letters concerning the other. In
holding for defendant the court said:
"In our opinion, there was sufficient provocation for retalia-
tion, and under the circumstances even though the retaliation
was of a nature which would not be justifiable in law, plaintiff
himself being at fault, cannot recover. The principle seems to
be well imbedded in our jurisprudence that in suits of this
kind where the parties have engaged in mutual vituperation
and abuse at each other, they are both wrong, and neither can
recover from the other. ' '4 7
42. See Malone, Insult in Retaliation (1939) 11 Miss. L.J. 333.
43. Fulda v. Caldwell, 9 La. Ann. 358 (1854); Johnston v. Barrett, 36 La.
Ann. 320 (1884); Goldberg v. Dobberton, 46 La. Ann. 1303, 16 So. 192 (1894);
Bloom v. Crescioni, 109 La. 667, 33 So. 724 (1903); Gilardino v. Patorno, 127 La.
255, 53 So. 556 (1910). The case of Mihojevich v. Bodechtel, 48 La. Ann. 618, 19
So. 672 (1896) has often been cited in support of this proposition, but an ex-
amination of this case discloses no mutual abuse.
44. 9 La. Ann. 358 (1854).
45. Bigney v. Van Benthuysen, 36 La. Ann. 38 (1884); C. S. Burt Co., Ltd.
V. Casey & Hedges Mfg. Co., 107 La. 231, 31 So. 667 (1902); Kenner v. Milner,
196 So. 535 (La. App. 1940).
46. 196 So. 535 (La. App. 1940).




Although Article 2315 unequivocally declares that "every act
whatever of man that causes damage to another, obliges him by
whose fault it happened to repair it," it is manifest that there are
many wrongs which cannot come within its contemplation. The
law runs the whole gamut of human relations; nevertheless there
are wrongs which, for reasons of judicial expediency, can only be
tried before the bar of conscience. It is impossible to determine at
just what point the Louisiana courts will extend the protection of
the law to persons emotionally injured by abusive language. Sit-
uations involving such injury are not satisfactorily susceptible to
general classification and rules of thumb. Words which ,might
shock the sensibilities of a refined and sheltered lady would have
no such effect upon her hardened sister of the streets. In cases
where it occurs, however, emotional damages, although highly
intangible, is none the less very real. Why should there not be
legal protection of such an interest when the facts are such that
judicial intervention is desirable?
The common law jurisdictions flatly refuse to recognize an
independent cause of action for mental suffering and humiliation
caused by insulting language. The Louisiana courts achieve sub-
stantially similar results, although their actual decisions are often
obscured by a smoke screen of dicta. It is significant, however,
that Louisiana is not bound by the rigid common law rules.48
There is much to be found in Louisiana jurisprudence to support
a liberal attitude, and much which may be relied upon should
Louisiana decide to lead the way in the forthright recognition of
an independent cause of action for mental and emotional disturb-
ance resulting from vile and insulting language.49
OLIVER P. SCHULINGKAMP
48. In Martin v. The Picayune, 115 La. 979, 986, 40 So. 376, 378 (1906) the
court said: "The common-law system has not gone as far as the civil law in
upholding actions for injurious words spoken or written."
49. An interesting dictum in the case of Graham v. Western Union Tele-
graph Co., 109 La. 1069, 1074, 34 So. 91, 93 (1903) speaks of such an action as
though it were well recognized in Louisiana jurisprudence. The court said:
"If a contracting party, by reason of a breach of contract, can be made leg-
ally responsible for damages on his part for the 'mortification' or the loss of
anticipated pleasure and enjoyment which his default has occasioned the
other contracting party, or if a man who has used harsh and insulting lan-
guage to another, short of defamation, can be held legally to respond in
money for the humiliation which he has caused the latter to suffer, no good
reason can be assigned why mental pain and suffering could not and should
not furnish equally the basis for a judgment for damages."
In Covington v. Robertson, 11 La. 326, 342, 35 So. 586, 593 (1903), the
court declared that under Article 2315 of the Civil Code all that is necessary
for a person judicially claiming damages to himself from a slander Is to allege
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